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The First Years of the  
South African Constitutional Court 
Hon. Justice Richard J. Goldstone 
By their nature, constitutions are more or less transformational. 
Some have provided the bridge from colonial rule to independence; 
others provide the bridge from oppression to freedom. The extent to 
which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 was intended to 
transform Canadian society remains a topic of controversy among 
Canadian lawyers. There can be no doubt that South Africa’s Constitution 
was intended to and has achieved a wholesale transformation of our 
society. It was self-consciously designed to transform our nation from 
oppression and racism to freedom and democracy. 
One of the demands made by the leaders of the “black” majority was 
a new apex court, the Constitutional Court. We followed the German 
model by situating that court above the existing courts. In order not to 
upset the members of the then highest court, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (as it is now called), the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court 
was limited to “constitutional issues” and matters related to them. The 
determination of what constitutes a constitutional issue is left by the 
Constitution for the Constitutional Court to determine. In Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Assn. of SA and Another In Re the Ex Parte Application 
of the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others2 it was held 
that the control of public power by the courts through judicial review is 
and always has been a constitutional matter. The Court said that: 
The interim Constitution which came into force in April 1994 was a 
legal watershed. It shifted constitutionalism, and with it all aspects of 
public law, from the realm of common law to the prescripts of a 
written constitution which is the supreme law. 
….. 
                                                                                                             

  Judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, July 1994 to October 2003. 
1
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2
  2000 (2) SA 674 (South Africa CC). 
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 … [J]udicial review of the exercise of public power is a constitutional 
matter that takes place under the Constitution and in accordance with 
its provisions.3 
In effect this made all violations of the rule of law “constitutional 
issues”. This included administrative law decisions. 
In 1990, when it was decided by South Africa’s white leadership to 
abandon Apartheid and usher in a new democratic form of government, 
there was a seemingly irresoluble difference at the fundamental level of 
how a new constitution should be fashioned.  
The “white” leaders, led by then President, F.W. de Klerk, were not 
prepared to give a blank cheque to the “black” majority. They were 
nervous of the close association of the African National Congress and 
the South African Communist Party as well as the powerful trade union 
movement that was also an integral part of the alliance. There was white 
fear that, if left to its own devices, the majority would write a socialist-
style document and that it would not protect the property that had been 
acquired over the centuries of white rule. On the other side, the “black” 
leaders, led by Nelson Mandela, insisted that the constitution be drafted 
by way of a democratic process and that the minority should not have a 
veto in that process.  
This apparently intractable difference was resolved in a highly 
unusual way. It was agreed that there would a two-part process. An 
interim constitution would usher in the democracy with the first one 
person, one vote national election. The duly elected representatives of all 
of the people would constitute a constitutional assembly and draft the 
final constitution. That met the demands of Nelson Mandela. To meet 
the demands of de Klerk, it was agreed that the interim constitution 
would contain the skeleton of the final constitution. That was achieved 
by way of a schedule containing 34 articles that came to be known as the 
34 constitutional principles. The final constitution was required to 
comply fully with each of the principles contained in the 34 articles. 
The obvious question was how and by whom it would be decided 
that the final constitution complied with the 34 constitutional principles. 
It was decided that that should be the task of the Constitutional Court. 
This was a huge responsibility and in effect meant the 11 unelected 
justices would have to determine the constitutionality of the constitution! 
We were obliged by the interim constitution to hear oral argument on 
behalf of the Constitutional Assembly that consisted of the members of 
                                                                                                             
3
  Id., at paras. 45 and 51. 
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both House of Parliament, and on behalf of all political parties 
represented in Parliament. In the exercise of our discretion we invited 
members of the public to make written representations reserving the 
right to determine which of them would be entitled, in addition, to 
appear and make oral representations. In the result we received 
representations from five political parties and 84 private parties. In July 
1996, we heard argument on behalf of the Constitutional Assembly, five 
political parties and 27 other bodies or persons. In deciding whom to 
invite to present oral argument, we were guided by the nature, novelty, 
cogency and importance of the points raised in the written submissions. 
After many conferences we unanimously held that the final 
constitution failed to comply with the 34 constitutional principles in 
respect of 12 areas.4 The Interim Constitution anticipated that there 
might be such a result and allowed the Constitutional Assembly to 
amend the constitution in order to bring it in line with the decision of the 
Court. In that context we issued a detailed judgment explaining as 
clearly as possible our decision. The Constitutional Assembly amended 
the constitution in order to meet the problems and referred it back for a 
consideration by the Court. Again, we heard many representations and in 
the end result certified that the whole constitution now complied with the 
34 constitutional principles. Fortunately we were again unanimous in our 
decision.5 What we call “the final Constitution” became effective in 
February 1997.  
I hardly need to add that it was a huge responsibility and, at the same 
time, an unusual privilege, to have had the opportunity of sitting on our 
first Constitutional Court. It was also an exciting and joyful experience 
to be a member of a highly collegial court and finding that we all shared 
a common understanding of the role we were called upon to play. 
Save for the death penalty, the representatives of all political parties 
reached rapid accord on the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Broadly 
speaking, the white leaders were in favour of retaining capital 
punishment while the black leaders wished to abolish it. It was decided 
to leave this issue for determination by the Constitutional Court. That 
issue was to be the first case heard by the new Court.  
                                                                                                             
4
  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly; Re Certification of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,1996 (4) SALR 744 (South Africa CC). 
5
  Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, 1997 (2) SALR 97 (South Africa CC). 
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The reason for agreement on the Bill of Rights is not difficult to 
locate. The anti-Apartheid movement, both within South Africa and 
internationally, was essentially a human rights movement. The black 
leaders always assumed that a democratic South Africa would be 
governed by an egalitarian constitution reflecting all internationally 
recognized human rights. This was demonstrated by the 1956 Freedom 
Charter adopted at a mass meeting outside Johannesburg. The Freedom 
Charter called for a democratic South Africa founded on non-racism and 
non-sexism. It declared that the land belonged to its entire people 
regardless of colour. It was a document well in advance of its times and 
clearly influenced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. No 
other freedom movement, whether on the African or any other continent, 
could claim to be or to have been a human rights movement. 
The majority of white South Africans had spurned human rights and 
accepted the benefits that came from the racist oppression of the 
Apartheid state. When white South Africans saw the writing on the wall 
and realized that they were to be governed by a majority of all South 
Africans, they became instant converts to protection by a Bill of Rights. 
Both sides welcomed wide-reaching protections against untrammelled 
rule by the majority.  
I return to the Constitutional Court. It is a quirk of history that the 
first time the 11 members of the new Court met was not in South Africa. 
The German Ambassador to South Africa suggested to the President of 
the German Constitutional Court that having regard to the similar 
reasons for the establishment of both courts, she should invite the 
members of our Court to a joint seminar with the members of the 
German Constitutional Court on issues that might be useful for us. We 
eagerly accepted an invitation to spend a week in Karlsruhe. This, I am 
sure, is another unique feature of the early years of our Court.  
The first 11 judges of our Court consisted of seven white and four 
black members. Two were women. The new members of the Court were 
all aware of the transformational nature of the new Constitution and the 
heavy responsibilities that we had assumed in sitting on our new 
democracy’s highest court.  
It was after the visit to Germany that we held our first business 
meeting. We had to decide on the manner in which we would conduct 
our business and even the appearance of the Court and its members. We 
wanted to demonstrate to the people of South Africa that we were not 
another South African court continuing in the tradition of the old. The 
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new values were in stark contrast to the old. The founding values are 
well stated in the first section of the final Constitution to be: 
a. Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement 
of human rights and freedoms. 
b. Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
c. Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
d. Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular 
elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to 
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
We were conscious that these new values should be reflected in 
everything the new Court would do in the course of its business. Some 
of the issues we decided included: 
(a) How we would robe. We did not wish to look like the existing 
judges who were identified by the majority of South Africans with 
the discredited Apartheid judicial system. South African judges had 
always worn black robes in the tradition we inherited from England. 
We decided that we would wear green gowns with the colours of our 
new flag on the sleeves of unisex robes. 
(b) We would not be addressed as “Milord” or worse “Milady” but as 
“Justice”. 
(c) We wanted the bench in the new Court (initially in a converted 
office building) to be raised minimally so that we could have 
comfortable eye contact with counsel — both for their benefit and to 
avoid the appearance of our being perceived to be remote from the 
people who visited court. 
(d) Obviously we would not take into account the seniority of the judges 
who had been appointed during the Apartheid era (of whom there 
were six). We decided, after much debate, to abandon seniority. The 
Chief Justice would preside and have the Deputy Chief Justice on 
his right and the other judges would sit in different seats during each 
of the four terms. Those would be determined by the Chief Justice 
by drawing names from a “hat”. We would walk in and out of court 
in the order in which we were seated. Opinions would be signed in 
alphabetical order. 
(e) We would establish a media committee, the work of which was to 
assist journalists in gaining effective access to the work of the Court, 
its decisions and documents. We also agreed to prepare a media 
release to accompany all opinions, explaining, in lay terms, the gist 
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of the decisions. We were also determined to have a user-friendly 
website. 
None of the members of the new Court had received any formal 
training in either constitutional law or human rights law. This presented 
an enjoyable and interesting challenge. I need hardly add that the use of 
foreign law played a crucial role in this regard. This, too, was anticipated 
by the drafters of the Constitution. Section 39(1) of the Bill of Rights 
provides that: 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 
a. must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
b. must consider international law; and  
c. may consider foreign law. 
And, section 233 of the Constitution provides that: 
When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law. 
Furthermore, one finds repeated references in the Constitution to 
“what is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. One of the most 
important is to be found in section 36, which governs the permissible 
extent to which rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights may be limited by 
legislation. These words are familiar to this audience and were clearly 
inspired by section 1 of the Canadian Charter.  
From the beginning, our Constitution and our Court’s jurisprudence 
were influenced by the Canadian experience. The Canadian Charter was 
an obvious source of inspiration. It was a comparatively new comer and 
leading Canadian constitutional lawyers assisted with the drafting 
process for our Interim Constitution and especially the Bill of Rights.  
The first judgment issued by the Court required a provision of the 
Bill of Rights to be interpreted. The following dictum of Dickson J. (as 
he then was) in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.6 was cited with approval: 
In my view this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of 
the right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the 
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  [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 31 
character and larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language 
chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical 
origins of the concept enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning 
and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is 
associated within the text of the Charter.7  
That purposive approach to the interpretation of our Constitution has 
consistently been followed by the Court.  
In the same case, the Canadian approach to statutory reverse onus 
provisions was also found to provide guidance to a court having no 
precedents of its own. It was Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. Oakes8 and R. v. 
Whyte9 and Cory J. in R. v. Downey10 who provided the beacons.  
A major Canadian import into our Constitution is the approach to 
limitations of rights. The scrutiny thresholds adopted by the United 
States Supreme Court had little appeal. At the threshold level we have 
incorporated the equivalent of section 1 of the Charter and, as is to be 
expected, we have learnt much from your jurisprudence — from the 
Oakes approach to more recent decisions. 
A third area in respect of which we learned from the Canadian 
approach relates to equality. The first equality decision of our Court was 
Hugo,11 in which I followed the important dictum of L’Heureux-Dubé J. 
in Egan v. Canada12 to the effect that the recognition of human dignity is 
situated at the heart of the equality provision.  
Finally, I would refer to the Canadian approach to extradition and 
the death sentence. We were faced with this issue in Mohamed and 
Another v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (Society 
for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in South Africa and Another),13 a 
case arising from the Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. embassies in 
Kinshasa and Dar es Salaam. The South African authorities had decided 
that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a Tanzanian citizen, had waived his 
rights to formal extradition and handed him over to U.S. officials for 
transfer to New York, where he faced the death penalty. We followed the 
                                                                                                             
7
  S. v. Zuma and Others, 1995 (2) SA 642, at para. 15 (South Africa CC). 
8
  [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
9
  [1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).  
10
  [1992] S.C.J. No. 48, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10 (S.C.C.). 
11
  President of the Republic of South Africa and another v. Hugo, 1997 (4) SA 1 (South 
Africa CC). 
12
  [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.). 
13
  2001 (3) SA 893 (South Africa CC). 
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approach in the then recent Burns decision14 to the effect that there is no 
obligation to extradite or deport any person without an assurance from 
the receiving state that the person will not face a death sentence. 
Needless to say, we have found valuable guidance in the jurisprudence 
of other democracies including the U.S., Germany, India and Namibia, 
to name but a few. 
In relation to the implementation of social and economic rights the 
Court has comprehensively considered the constitutionality and propriety 
of issuing structural orders. In the TAC case15 it was held that such orders 
are in no way inconsistent with the separation of powers and that our 
courts are empowered to make such orders in appropriate cases. 
However, it was also held that as the government had consistently 
implemented decisions of the courts it was not appropriate to issue a 
structural injunction. The Court did order the government forthwith to 
distribute the antiretroviral drug, Nevirapine, for the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission of the HIV virus. The Court compelled the 
government to act in a manner that was anathema to the Minister of 
Health. She nonetheless complied with the order. One thinks, too, of the 
decision compelling the government to provide social welfare benefits to 
permanent residents as well as citizens — at a cost of many millions of 
rands.16  
I propose to end with a brief reference to two areas where our 
Constitutional Court has struck out in new directions. The first relates to 
the necessity for legislatures to hold reasonable public consultation prior 
to passing controversial legislation. The Constitutional Court in effect 
held that, properly construed, our Constitution creates not only a 
representative democracy but also a “participative” democracy. It is not 
sufficient for the people to be consulted only every five years through 
the ballot box but continuously with regard to the making of legislation. 
In Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly 
and Others,17 the Court held that:  
Under our Constitution, therefore, the obligation to facilitate public 
involvement is a requirement of the law-making process.18 
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  United States of America v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.). 
15
  Ministry of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (2002) 5 SA 721 (South Africa CC). 
16
  2004 (6) BCLR 569 (South Africa CC). 
17
  2006 (6) SA 416 (South Africa CC). 
18
  Id., at para. 207. 
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Its decision was that a statute relating to the regulation of abortions 
was a matter of intense public interest and that there had not been 
reasonable public consultation in the legislative process. The statute, on 
that ground, was held to be unconstitutional. 
Then, earlier this year in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea 
Township v. City of Johannesburg and Others,19 the City of Johannesburg 
sought to evict the residents of derelict buildings in the city centre as part 
of a regeneration program. The residents claimed that the provision of 
suitable alternative accommodation was a precondition for an eviction 
order. After hearing oral argument, the Constitutional Court ordered the 
parties to “meaningfully engage” with each other to find a mutually 
satisfactory solution to the problem. They were ordered further to report 
back to the Court on the engagement within 30 days. This unusual order 
worked and the parties did settle their differences. The City agreed to 
make the existing buildings safe and habitable until appropriate 
alternative accommodation was made available. The Court then issued a 
general order obliging parties in such cases to “meaningfully engage” 
prior to seeking relief from a court. 
There are the usual problems faced by the judiciary in many 
democracies — at the moment draft legislation taking away control of 
the budgets of the courts from the Chief Justice and placing it in the 
hands of the Minister of Justice. These problems aside, however, having 
regard to where we stood at the death of Apartheid in 1994, I would 
suggest that we have made remarkable progress. It has also been a matter 
of personal pride that the South African Constitutional Court, in its short 
life, has built a positive reputation that is recognized throughout the 
democratic world. I would emphasize its contribution in the area of 
social and economic rights. 
South Africa has good reason to feel indebted to Canada for the 
advances we have made on the often difficult road from oppression to 
freedom and democracy. 
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  2008 (3) SA 208 (South Africa CC). 
 
 
